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Abstract 
A number of lab experiments in recent years have analyzed people’s willingness to compete. 
But to what extent is competitive behavior in the lab associated with field choices and outcomes? 
We address this question in a setting of entrepreneurship, where we combine lab evidence on 
competitiveness with field evidence on investment, employment, profit, and sales. We find 
strong evidence that competitiveness in the lab is positively associated with competitive choices 
in the field (investment and employment) and weaker, but suggestive, evidence of a positive 
link to successful field outcomes (profit and sales). Other non-cognitive skills measured in the 
lab, including risk- and time preferences and confidence, and cognitive skills are less 
consistently associated with the field variables. Our findings suggest that the willingness to 
compete in the lab identifies an important entrepreneurial trait that shapes the entrepreneur’s 
field choices and to some extent also field outcomes. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a growing literature studying competitive behavior in the lab, but little is still 
known about how competitive behavior in the lab is associated with field choices, and 
even less is known about how it is associated with field outcomes.1 Buser et al. (2014) 
and Zhang (2012) study secondary school students and demonstrate that competitive 
choices in the lab are associated with entry into competitive study profiles and exams. 
These studies do not consider field outcomes, even though it is clearly important to 
understand whether the students make the right educational choices. Choosing to 
compete is not necessarily a winning strategy, and therefore, ultimately, we would 
also like to know whether competitive behavior in the lab maps into successful 
outcomes in the field.  
 
The present paper contributes to this literature by studying the association between 
competitiveness in the lab and entrepreneurial choices and outcomes in the field, using 
a group of small-scale business owners in Tanzania as subject pool.2 The entrepreneurs 
took part in a lab experiment, where we in addition to competitiveness also measured 
other non-cognitive skills, such as risk- and time preferences and confidence, and 
cognitive skills. They were subsequently visited at their business over a two-year 
period to measure field choices and outcomes. Small-scale entrepreneurship is an 
attractive setting for studying the association between the lab and the field for two 
reasons. First, it offers a rather uncontroversial measure of success in the field, namely 
profit (or sales). Second, it provides a context where it is reasonable to assume that 
business practices observed in the field reflect the choices of the owner; we use 
investment and employment decisions as indicators of competitive field choices, as 
these may be used to give a firm a competitive advantage relative to other firms (by 
increasing capacity and lowering marginal costs).  
 
Our study shows that (i) there is a strong and robust association between competitive 
behavior in the lab and investment and employment choices in the field, (ii) 
entrepreneurs who compete in the lab tend to have higher profits than those who do 
not compete, and (iii) willingness to compete is the entrepreneurial characteristic that 
is most consistently associated with competitive choices and successful outcomes; 
other cognitive and non-cognitive skills have less consistent explanatory power. 
                                                        
1 Key contributions to the experimental literature on competitiveness include Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007), Booth and Nolen (2012), Flory et al. (2010), Gneezy et al. (2003, 2009), Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2004), and Healy and Pate (2011). See also Fortin (2008), who shows that individuals who self-report 
being more competitive have higher wages and earn more, and Örs et al (2008) who find that women 
perform worse than men in a competitive setting, but outperform men in a less competitive setting. See 
Levitt and List, (2007a,b) and Falk and Fehr (2003) for discussions of the external validity of lab 
experiments. 
2  On the determinants of entrepreneurship more generally, see Becker (1975), Lazear (2004, 2005), 
Heckman et al. (2006), Hall and Woodward (2010), Vereshchagina and Hopenhayn (2009), Read and 
van Leeuwen (1998), Doepke and Zilibotti (2013), and Acs et al. (2005). 
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A number of other studies have shown that risk- and time preferences measured in the 
lab are strongly associated with field behavior. Sutter et al. (2013) demonstrate this for 
health, savings, and conduct at school, using a of a sample of children and adolescents, 
and Dohmen et al. (2011) and Fisher (2010) show that risk preferences in particular are 
strongly associated with career choice.3 Our paper differs from these studies in two 
important ways. First, by considering a very different sample, namely small-scale 
entrepreneurs in a development context. Second, by including willingness to compete 
alongside risk and time preferences, which enables us to shed light on which is the 
more important entrepreneurial trait for competitive choices and successful outcomes.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the data 
from the lab and from the field. In section 3, we present the results from our study. In 
section 4, we provide concluding remarks. 
2. Sample and data 
Our sample consists of 207 small-scale entrepreneurs in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, all 
members of one of the leading microfinance institutions in the country, PRIDE 
Tanzania. Most of them are involved in small-scale commerce (running a small kiosk, 
having a stall at the market) or different sorts of service activities (hairdressing, small 
restaurants), with a few also involved in light manufacturing (tailoring, carpentry, 
brick making) or agriculture. They are organized in loan groups of five entrepreneurs, 
who are jointly responsible for each other’s loans in the microfinance institution. There 
are 143 loan groups represented in our sample. The entrepreneurs formed part of a 
larger randomized control trial on entrepreneurship promotion, involving more than 
600 subjects, documented in Berge et al. (2014). 4  Half of the entrepreneurs in our 
sample had randomly been offered business training as part of the larger research 
project (the training program was completed in January 2009), and all of them 
subsequently received a business grant of 100 000 Tanzanian Shillings (TZS) (around 
80 USD).  
 
The lab experiment was organized in March 2009. The entrepreneurs in our sample 
were randomly selected, among all the entrepreneurs involved in the larger 
randomized control trial, to take part in the lab experiment. The field data are from 
two survey rounds that we conducted in June-July 2009 and June-September 2011, 
                                                        
3  A number of other interesting lab experiments study how social preferences and trust relate to 
different types of field behavior, see for example Ashraf et al., 2006; Benz and Meier, 2008; Dohmen and 
Falk, 2011; Karlan, 2005; Meier and Sprenger, 2010, and Jakiela et al., 2010.  
4 At the time of the baseline, the entrepreneurs in our study had loans at the intermediate steps of the 
microfinance institution’s loan ladder, and should thus be rather typical of microfinance clients in Dar 
es Salaam. Indeed, given the prevalence of microfinance, we conjecture that the entrepreneurs in our 
sample are fairly representative of small-scale entrepreneurs in urban Tanzania.  
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where we visited all the entrepreneurs at their business premises. We managed to 
interview 207 out of the 211 entrepreneurs in at least one of the survey rounds, 194 in 
2007 and 197 in 2011, and thus we have very low attrition. 5  In addition, we use 
background data (age and education) from the baseline survey that we conducted in 
June-July 2008 as part of the larger randomized control trial.   
 
The upper part of Table 1 provides more details about the background of the 
entrepreneurs. We observe that the majority of the entrepreneurs in our sample are 
females, in line with the gender distribution in PRIDE. The average entrepreneur is 39 
years old, married, and has completed primary schooling (which is seven years in 
Tanzania), but we observe that there is substantial heterogeneity both in age (ranging 
from 22 to 63 years) and in education (ranging from 0 to 18 years).  
 
The lower part of Table 1 provides an overview of the field choices and field outcomes 
that we focus on in the analysis. These variables are self-reported by the entrepreneurs. 
Investments are measured as total investments in the two survey rounds, excluding 
purchases of stocks. Typical investments are sewing machines for tailors, cooking 
equipment, fridges, chairs and tables for small restaurant or kiosk owners, or general 
refurbishment of business premises. Average total investments are 762 000 TZS 
(approximately 610 USD), where 16% of the entrepreneurs had no investments in the 
survey period.  
 
We study two types of employment choices; the number of employees in the business 
and how active the entrepreneur decides to be in the employer-employee relationship. 
The number of employees is measured as the average number of workers in the 
business in the two survey rounds, and can be interpreted as an indicator of growth in 
the business. We observe that the average entrepreneur has slightly less than one 
worker and that almost 35% of the entrepreneurs do not have any workers in the 
business, while no entrepreneur has more than six workers. To study the employer-
employee relationship, we consider the total number of times the entrepreneur has 
fired a worker or given a worker a bonus in the survey period. Both firing of workers 
and the offering of bonuses may increase the competitiveness of the business, by 
reducing the number of low-productive workers and increasing worker productivity. 
We observe that the average entrepreneur has fired 0.75 workers and given a bonus to 
1.2 workers in the survey period. Almost 70% of the entrepreneurs have not fired any 
workers and 46% of the entrepreneurs have not given any bonuses.  
 
Regarding field outcomes, we focus on self-reported profits and sales, where sales are 
seen as an alternative proxy for profits. Obtaining high quality data on profits and 
sales from small-scale entrepreneurs in a development context is notoriously difficult, 
                                                        
5 For the entrepreneurs that we only reached in one of the two survey rounds, we assume that the 
observation also is representative for the other survey round. 
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since few entrepreneurs have reliable records. We therefore rely on self-reported data 
also for the field outcomes, in line with de Mel et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) and Karlan and 
Valdivia (2011). Specifically, we consider average monthly sales and average monthly 
operating profits in the survey period. The average entrepreneur has monthly sales of 
2 330 000 TZS (approximately 1865 USD), and a profit margin of 26%. Two 
entrepreneurs report not having any sales or profits in the survey period. 
 
In the lab we collected data on a broad set of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, and 
Table 2 provides an overview of the different measures.6 We have three measures of 
cognitive skills; math skills, business knowledge, and general knowledge, all based on 
the performance of the entrepreneur on different incentivized multiple-choice 
questions (250 TZS per correct answer) and all ranging from 0 (no question answered 
correctly) to 10 (all questions answered correctly).7 The math questions consisted of 
adding numbers; the business questions were on best practice in business, covering 
topics such as customer care, employee management, time management, and 
definitions of sales, profits, variable costs, and working capital; the general topics 
covered current events in sports and politics as well as questions on health and 
Tanzanian geography.  
 
From the upper part of Table 2, we observe that the business questions seem to have 
been easiest; the entrepreneurs answered on average seven out of ten questions 
correctly. For math and general knowledge, the average score was about five correct 
answers. We also observe that there is considerable heterogeneity in the sample: about 
15% of the entrepreneurs had nine or ten correct answers on the math questions, while 
30% of the entrepreneurs had no more than three correct answers. We observe similar 
differences for the business knowledge and general knowledge questions.  
 
The non-cognitive skills that we focus on in the analysis are willingness to compete, 
risk- and time preferences, and confidence. To measure the entrepreneurs’ willingness 
to compete, we announced a second round of new multiple-choice questions on the 
same six topics that we used to measure the cognitive skills, but this time the 
participants had to decide whether to compete or not. If entrepreneurs decided to 
compete on a topic and performed better than “a typical microcredit client”, they were 
paid 750 TZS per correct answer, otherwise nothing.8 If the entrepreneurs decided not 
to compete, they were paid a flat rate of 250 TZS per correct answer. The entrepreneurs 
                                                        
6 More details about the lab can be found in Bjorvatn and Tungodden (2010). The lab instructions are 
provided in Appendix B.  
7 All the multiple-choice questions used in the lab are provided in Appendix C. 
8  We used the phrase “a typical microcredit client” to simplify the language in the experimental 
instructions. The benchmark that the entrepreneurs had to beat in the competitive setting was the 
average score on these multiple-choice questions in a pilot we conducted with other clients of PRIDE 
Tanzania. None of the participants in the lab asked us for the precise definition of the benchmark. 
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had to make the competitiveness choice for each of the six topics, which means that 
the measure of willingness to compete ranges from zero to six.  
 
Our measure of confidence is non-incentivized. After the completion of each of the six 
sets of multiple-choice questions in the first round (when everyone was paid the flat 
piece rate of 250 TZS), the participants were asked: “Do you believe that you are better 
than, equal to, or worse than a typical microcredit client in answering questions on 
topic X?” The confidence variable ranges from minus six (the entrepreneur believes he 
or she is worse on all the topics) to six (the entrepreneur believes he or she is better on 
all the topics). The confidence measure is zero if the entrepreneur believes that he or 
she is equally good as a typical microcredit client on all topics.  
 
From Table 2, we observe that the entrepreneurs on average chose to compete on more 
than half of the topics (3.72 out of 6), even though on average they were not confident 
about their own abilities. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the willingness to compete 
measured by gender. We observe that more than 30% of the entrepreneurs chose to 
compete in all six rounds, while around 15% never competed. In line with the existing 
literature (see for instance Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007), we also find a significant 
gender difference in the willingness to compete; males are on average much more 
willing to compete than females (4.5 times versus 3.3 times). 
 
To measure risk preferences, the entrepreneurs were presented with four situations 
where they could choose between a risky alternative with two equally likely outcomes, 
6000 TZS or nothing, and a safe alternative. The value of the safe alternative varied 
across the four situations, taking the values 1000 TZS, 1500 TZS, 2000 TZS, and 2500 
TZS respectively. We use the number of times the entrepreneur chose the risky 
alternative as our measure of the willingness to take risk, which therefore ranges from 
zero to four. 9  From Table 2, we observe that the average entrepreneur chose the risky 
alternative twice. 21% of the entrepreneurs chose to compete in all four situations, 
while 15% of the entrepreneurs never competed.  
 
Time preferences were measured by offering the entrepreneurs different alternatives 
for when to receive the participation fee for the lab experiment, where they would 
receive a larger participation fee by delaying the payment date. The participants could 
choose between being paid one week after the lab and receive 15 000 Tsh, three weeks 
after the lab and receive 20 000 TZS, and five weeks after the lab and receive 25 000 
TZS.10   Hence, by delaying payment by four weeks, their participation fee would 
increase by 67 percent. We use the number of weeks they chose to wait for the 
participation fee as our measure of time preferences, which means that this variable 
                                                        
9 Note that our measure or risk aversion only captures different levels of risk aversion, and can therefore 
not identify whether the entrepreneurs are risk neutral or risk loving.  
10 To minimize the issue of trust when comparing the different payment alternatives, all alternatives implied 
that the payment would take place in the future. Being paid immediately was not an option.   
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takes the value of 1, 3 or 5. From Table 2, we observe that the entrepreneurs on average 
waited slightly more than three weeks. Almost 50% of the entrepreneurs waited five 
weeks, while 31% of the entrepreneurs only waited one week. 
3. Empirical strategy 
Our main aim is to study how the entrepreneurs’ field choices and field outcomes are 
associated with cognitive skills and non-cognitive skills measured in the lab. For this 
purpose, we run standard OLS regressions where the dependent variable is a field 
variable (investment, employment, sales, profits) and the explanatory variables are the 
non-cognitive lab variables (compete, risk, time, and confidence), the cognitive lab 
variables (math, business knowledge and general knowledge), and a set of background 
variables (training, female, age, education, and marital status). Standard errors are 
clustered at the loan group level, since loan group members are jointly liable for their 
loans and the error term therefore may be correlated within these groups.  
 
We consider both untransformed outcomes and log-transformed outcomes when 
analyzing investments, profits and sales, while we only consider the untransformed 
outcomes for the employment variables. The untransformed outcomes are always 
mean-standardized. When considering log-transformed outcomes, we face the 
problem that 34 entrepreneurs have not invested anything in the survey period and 
two entrepreneurs have zero profit. In these cases, we replace the actual value with the 
lowest observed value in the sample.  
 
The focus of our analysis is the estimated coefficients for the lab variables. Even though 
these estimates cannot be given a causal interpretation, they shed light on whether 
there is an association between lab behavior and field choices and outcomes for the 
entrepreneurs.11 A worry with our empirical strategy, however, might be that the 
different lab variables are strongly correlated. In Table A1 in Appendix A we therefore 
report the correlation matrix for all the lab measures. We observe that the correlations 
between the different non-cognitive skills are very weak, while, not surprisingly, there 
are stronger correlations among the three cognitive skills measures. In the following, 
we supplement the main analysis with robustness tests that show that our results are 
not driven by multicollinearity in the data. 
4. Results 
We here report the main regressions showing how the lab variables are associated with 
the field choices and outcomes. 
 
                                                        
11 Note that the background variable “Training” has a causal interpretation, given the randomized design 
described in Berge et al. (2014). As shown in Berge et al. (2014), there is no causal effect of the training 
on the willingness to compete in the lab.    
SNF Working Paper No 02/15
 8 
Table 3 reports the regressions with investment as the dependent variable. We observe 
that for all specifications, the willingness to compete in the lab is strongly and 
consistently associated with investments in the field. Columns (1)-(3) report 
regressions where the investment variable is untransformed, and the estimated 
coefficients show that competing one more time in the lab is associated with an 
increase in total investments of 0.04 – 0.06 standard deviations. If we consider the 
specifications where the investment variable is log-transformed, columns (4)-(6), we 
find that the estimated coefficients on the willingness to compete are associated with 
an increase in total investments of 13-20%. Importantly, we also observe that the 
association between competing in the lab and total investments is robust to the 
inclusion of both other lab variables and background variables. 
 
We also observe that the willingness to compete is the only lab variable that is 
consistently associated with total investments in the field. Risk preferences are 
strongly associated with total investments when the dependent variable is log-
transformed, where more risky behavior in the lab is associated with more total 
investments. But the point estimates for risk are negative, although not significant, in 
the regressions where the investment variable is untransformed. Time preferences and 
confidence in the lab are not consistently associated with total investments for any of 
the specifications. The three measures of cognitive skills are in almost all cases 
positively associated with total investments, but this association is only statistically 
significant for the general knowledge variable when we use the log-transformed 
dependent variable and include demographic controls.12   
 
Turning to Table 4, we observe that the willingness to compete is also consistently and 
significantly associated with all the employment decisions, even when we include 
other lab variables and other background variables. Columns (1)-(3) show that one 
more competitive choice in the lab is associated with an increase in the number of 
workers in the business by 0.05-0.06 standard deviations; columns (4)-(9) suggest an 
association of the same magnitude between competitive behavior in the lab and the 
number of fired workers and bonuses offered in the period. For employment decisions, 
we also observe that there is some association between the risk- and time preferences 
in the lab and employment decisions in the field. Patience in the lab is associated with 
employing fewer workers, firing fewer workers, and giving fewer bonuses. For risk 
preferences, we observe that risky behavior in the lab is associated with firing more 
workers, but not significantly associated with the other two employment decisions. 
Further, we observe that there is a positive association between confidence in the lab 
and the number of workers to whom the entrepreneur has given a bonus. It is an open 
question how to interpret the associations observed for risk- and time preferences and 
                                                        
12 Here, and in the following, we do not focus on the estimated coefficients for the background variables. 
For a further analysis of the larger data set including all the entrepreneurs involved in the randomized 
control trial, see Berge et al. (2014). 
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confidence, but for our analysis the important point is that the inclusion of these 
variables does not affect the strong association we find between competitive behavior 
in the lab and competitive employment decisions in the field. Finally, we observe that 
there are no significant associations between the lab measures of cognitive skills and 
employment decisions in the field. 
 
Table 5 and Table 6 report regressions of the field outcomes (profits and sales) on lab 
variables and background variables. We observe that the willingness to compete in the 
lab is positively associated with the profits of the business, although the association is 
not as strong as for investment or employment choices and only statistically significant 
when we consider the specification where the dependent variable is untransformed. 
From columns (1)-(3), we observe that choosing to compete one more time in the lab is 
associated with an increase in profits by 0.05-0.06 standard deviations. We also observe 
from Table 5 that willingness to compete is the only variable that is significantly 
associated with profits. Table 6 shows the regressions for sales on lab variables and 
background variables, where we observe that none of the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant, with the exception of risk preferences in the log-transformed 
specification including both lab variables and background variables.  
 
Robustness checks largely confirm our main results. First, to see whether the results 
are partly driven by multicollinearity, we have regressed the field choices and field 
outcomes on each of the lab variables separately. The main picture from our multiple 
variable regressions holds; the willingness to compete clearly stands out as the lab-
measure that is most systematically associated with the field variables (see Table A2 
in Appendix A).  
 
Second, inspired by Grosse and Reiner (2010) and Günther et al. (2009), who show that 
the type of task may matter for competitive behavior, we also study whether the 
association between the willingness to compete and field variables is specific for 
certain topics. We therefore regress the field variables separately on each of the six 
competition decisions in the lab (see Table A3 in appendix A). Although we find some 
differences among the domains, no clear pattern stands out, indicating that our results 
are not domain sensitive.  
 
Third, we consider whether the entrepreneurs who make successful competition choices 
in the lab mainly drive the results. For this optimality analysis, we rely on the framework 
introduced in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007), where they distinguish between the ex 
ante and ex post approach. The ex ante approach considers whether the participant 
made a successful choice given the performance in the first round, while the ex post 
approach considers whether the participant made a successful choice given how he or 
she actually performed in the competition. As shown in Table A9 in Appendix A, the 
ex ante approach provides a stronger association with field outcomes than the ex post 
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approach, but none of them outperform the competition variable used in the main 
analysis.13  
 
Finally, given that our field variables are self-reported by the entrepreneurs, one might 
question whether our results are driven by a correlation between the willingness to 
compete and a willingness to over-report, for example, profits and sales. In the 2011 
survey, we introduced a test of “bragging”, where we asked the entrepreneurs about 
their knowledge of different business terms. Half of these business terms were 
meaningless, and thus we take as a measure of bragging the number of meaningless 
business terms that the entrepreneur claimed to know. All our results are robust to the 
inclusion of this variable in the analysis.14  
  
In sum, our analysis shows that the willingness to compete in the lab is strongly and 
consistently associated with field choices (investments and employment decisions), 
while the evidence on a positive association with field outcomes is more suggestive 
for profits and absent for sales. This weaker relationship with field outcomes is not 
surprising. First, field outcomes such as profits and sales are harder to measure than 
the variables capturing the field choices. Second, the entrepreneurs clearly have less 
control over field outcomes than field choices: entrepreneurs can directly implement 
investments and employment decisions, while profits or sales are to an important 
extent determined by market factors beyond the entrepreneurs’ control.  
 
The literature on competitiveness has been particularly concerned with gender issues, 
and thus in Appendix A we also extend our main analysis to include gender 
interaction effects for the willingness to compete. As shown in Tables A4-A7, no 
systematic pattern emerges. The association between competition in the lab and field 
variables seems to be stronger for female entrepreneurs when we consider investments, 
but stronger for male entrepreneurs when we consider the number of workers in the 
business. In all the other cases, the gender interaction effect is insignificant.  
 
5. Concluding remarks  
To what extent can competitive behavior in the lab say something about real world 
choices and outcomes? Given the large number of lab experiments on competitiveness, 
there are so far surprisingly few studies addressing this question.  
 
Our study shows that the willingness to compete in the lab is strongly associated with 
field choices made by small-scale entrepreneurs in a developing country context, and 
to some extent also positively associated with the profits of their businesses. Other 
non-cognitive skills, such as risk- and time preferences and confidence, as well as 
                                                        
13  In Table A8 in the Appendix A, we also show that the willingness to compete is strongly positively 
associated with the amount of money an entrepreneur were paid overall in the lab.  
14 We have not included the variable in the regressions, because it reduces the sample size (we have this 
variable only for the entrepreneurs that we reached in 2011). 
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cognitive skills, are also associated with some field variables, but arguably less 
consistently than competitiveness. Our results therefore suggest that the willingness 
to compete is a key entrepreneurial trait, and possibly more important than other non-
cognitive skills often measured in the lab. An important avenue for further research is 
to see whether our results also hold for small-scale entrepreneurs in other contexts, 
and, more broadly, whether there is an association between the willingness to compete 
in the lab and important field outcomes for other groups in society.  
 
Our results may be of importance for policy interventions aiming at empowering 
small-scale entrepreneurs, particularly females who are typically less willing to 
compete than males. They suggest an increased focus on the importance of being 
willing to compete in order to succeed in business, even though the optimal level of 
competitive behavior is still an open question both in the lab and in the field.  
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Table 1: The Field 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Background     
Female 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Age 38.88 8.08 22 63 
Education 7.87 2.39 0 18 
Marital status 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Training 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Choices     
Investment (in 1000 TZS) 762 1390 0 10552 
No. of workers 0.89 1.02 0 6 
No. of fired workers 0.75 1.62 0 13 
No. of workers given bonus 1.19 1.82 0 16 
Outcomes     
Profit (in 1000 TZS) 613 745 0 7136 
Sales (in 1000 TZS) 2330 3096 0 18970 
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the field variables for the 207 entrepreneurs that we reached in 
the survey rounds. Background: Female is a dummy indicating whether the entrepreneur is a female. Age is 
the age of the entrepreneur, in years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is a dummy 
indicating whether the client is married. Training is a dummy indicating whether the entrepreneur was 
offered business training. Choice: Investment is total investments summarized over the two survey rounds 
(in 1000 TZS). No. of workers is the average number of workers across the two survey rounds. No. of fired 
workers is the number of fired workers summarized over the two surveys. No. of workers given bonus is the 
number of workers given a bonus summarized over the two surveys. Outcomes: Profit is the average profit 
across the two survey rounds (1000 TZS). Sales is the average profit across the two survey rounds (1000 
TZS) 
 
Table 2: The Lab 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Cognitive skills 
Math 
Business knowledge 
General knowledge 
Non-cognitive skills 
Compete 
 
5.31 
6.96 
5.09 
 
3.72 
 
2.83 
1.98 
1.53 
 
2.24 
 
0 
0 
2 
 
0 
 
10 
10 
9 
 
6 
Confidence 
Risk 
-0.75 
2.01 
2.32 
1.34 
-6 
0 
6 
4 
Time 3.36 1.76 1 5 
 
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of the lab variables for the 207 entrepreneurs that we reached in 
the survey rounds. Cognitive skills: Math is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test 
on additions. Business knowledge is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on 
business facts and practices. General knowledge is the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four 
general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health and nutrition, and places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania). 
Non-cognitive skills: Compete is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur decided to compete (0-6). 
Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than the others). Risk 
SNF Working Paper No 02/15
17 
is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur chose the risky alternative (0-4). Time is the number of 
weeks the client chose to wait before collecting the participation fee (1, 3 or 5 weeks)
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Table 6: Sales 
  Sales (standardized)  Sales (log) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Lab Compete 0.023 0.013 0.007  0.008 0.010 -0.001 
  (0.034) (0.036) (0.037)  (0.030) (0.032) (0.033) 
 Risk  -0.065 -0.088   -0.066 -0.085* 
   (0.061) (0.062)   (0.052) (0.051) 
 Time  0.035 0.043   -0.009 -0.004 
   (0.039) (0.045)   (0.036) (0.038) 
 Confidence  -0.016 -0.019   -0.013 -0.028 
   (0.030) (0.035)   (0.028) (0.029) 
 Math  0.006 0.002   0.034 0.035 
   (0.037) (0.039)   (0.029) (0.034) 
 Business knowledge  0.053 0.045   0.035 0.015 
   (0.038) (0.045)   (0.037) (0.041) 
 General knowledge  0.012 0.006   -0.044 -0.060 
   (0.060) (0.063)   (0.056) (0.060) 
Background Training   -0.034    0.106 
    (0.159)    (0.151) 
 Female   -0.149    -0.267 
    (0.189)    (0.175) 
 Age   -0.013    -0.013 
    (0.009)    (0.008) 
 Education   0.005    0.009 
    (0.025)    (0.029) 
 Marital status   -0.140    0.009 
    (0.168)    (0.149) 
 Constant -0.084 -0.515 0.321  7.301*** 7.246*** 8.047*** 
  (0.120) (0.314) (0.497)  (0.123) (0.279) (0.456) 
 R2 0.003 0.030 0.047  0.000 0.027 0.059 
 N 207 207 207  207 207 207 
Note: The table reports coefficients from OLS regressions. The outcome in columns 1-3 is the average sales across the 
two survey rounds, mean standardized. In columns 4-6, the outcome is the log of sales. Compete is measured as the 
number of times the entrepreneur decided to compete (0-6). Risk is measured as the number of times the entrepreneur 
chose the risky alternative (0-4). Time is the number of weeks the client chose to wait before collecting the show up fee 
(1, 3 or 5 weeks). Confidence is measured on a scale from minus six (worse than the others) to six (better than the 
others). Math is the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on additions. Business knowledge is 
the number of correct answers (0-10) on a multiple-choice test on business facts and practices. General knowledge is 
the average number of correct answers (0-10) on four general topics (sports and leisure, politics, health and nutrition, 
and places in Dar es Salaam and Tanzania). Training is a dummy indicating whether the entrepreneur was offered 
business training. Female is a dummy indicating whether the entrepreneur is a female. Age is the age of the 
entrepreneur, in years. Education is the years of schooling. Marital status is a dummy indicating whether the client is 
married. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses; *p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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